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Abstract 
We investigate whether stock prices reflect the asymmetric persistence of accruals and cash flows 
resulting from conditional conservatism. Using the Mishkin (1983) test (MT), we provide further evidence 
on the earnings fixation explanation for the accrual anomaly. We also apply panel estimation techniques 
that significantly affect market efficiency inferences. Our results suggest that over our sample period (1) 
investors seem to partially anticipate asymmetric persistence in accruals and cash flows; (2) the accrual 
anomaly originates in the mispricing of accruals in years of economic gains, even though the differential 
persistence between accruals and cash flows is greatest in years of economic losses; (3) investors respond 
differently to accrual and cash flow surprises and therefore they do not naively fixate on earnings 
surprises; and (4) after clustering standard errors in the MT by firm and year dimensions, there is no 
longer evidence of cash flow mispricing, while the statistical significance of accrual mispricing falls. All 
our findings contradict the earnings fixation explanation for the accrual anomaly. Our study has 
implications for understanding the accrual anomaly in relation to accrual dynamics, as well as for 
researchers interested in using the MT framework to test the rationality of investor expectations more 
generally. 
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1. Introduction 
The negative correlation between accruals and future stock returns first identified by Sloan (1996) is 
now a well-established empirical regularity found in many stock markets.
1
 The label “accrual anomaly”, 
often used to describe this effect, reveals a lack of consensus on whether accruals capture exposure to un-
modeled risk factors (Khan 2008; Wu et al. 2010) or they are mispriced as a result of irrational 
information processing. A common conjecture consistent with irrational behavior is that investors behave 
as if they ‘fixate’ on earnings and do not fully understand differences in the persistence of accruals 
relative to cash flows (Sloan 1996; Richardson et al. 2005). A recent paper by Shi and Zhang (2012) 
provides further evidence in support of the earnings fixation hypothesis.
2
 In this paper we re-examine the 
accrual anomaly in light of two relevant strands of the accounting research. The first strand identifies 
asymmetry in the persistence of accruals resulting from timely loss recognition under conservative 
accounting (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2006). The second strand suggests that the differential 
ability of accruals and cash flows to predict (abnormal) earnings and the differential persistence of each 
earnings component result in the components having different pricing implications (Barth et al. 1999; 
Ohlson 1999; Pope and Wang 2005).  
We conduct our analysis by adapting the Mishkin (1983) test (hereafter MT), first introduced to the 
accounting literature by Sloan (1996), to incorporate both the asymmetric persistence of accruals and the 
differential pricing of accruals and cash flows. While the MT does not offer advantages relative to a 
single step OLS regression when the sole research objective is to identify market inefficiencies (Kraft et 
al. 2007), it is capable of providing additional insights to the channels through which market 
inefficiencies arise (Abel and Mishkin 1983). Our findings indicate that once asymmetric persistence in 
accruals and differential pricing of accruals and cash flows are introduced, the earnings fixation 
hypothesis is no longer able to explain the accrual anomaly.
3
 More importantly, even though the 
differential persistence between accruals and cash flows is greatest in years of economic losses, the 
accrual anomaly appears to originate in the mispricing of accruals in years of economic gains – a result 
that is inconsistent with the earnings fixation hypothesis. 
It is well known that when firms experience economic losses accruals contain more transitory negative 
components, whereas when firms experience economic gains good news is realized in earnings slowly 
                                                 
1
 See Richardson et al. (2010) for a recent review and discussion. 
2
 Further non-mutually exclusive explanations offered in the literature include the possibility that accruals are 
associated with the growth anomaly (Zhang 2007), and that mispricing related to accruals persists because of limits 
to arbitrage (Mashruwala et al. 2006). See Shi and Zhang (2012) for further discussion.  
3
 We note that it would be possible to modify the MT in various ways, by replacing or supplementing earnings 
components with other variables correlated with future returns (Lewellen 2010). We confine our analysis to accruals 
and cash flows because this allows us to simultaneously examine the accrual anomaly and the earnings fixation 
hypothesis. 
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and in a more persistent manner.
4
 The lower persistence of accruals when firms experience economic 
losses is important in forecasting future earnings, accruals, and cash flows. Consequently, expectations 
models that do not accommodate the effects of timely loss recognition will be biased, and inferences 
concerning market efficiency and mispricing could be sensitive to such bias. Our results provide evidence 
that investors partially anticipate the asymmetric persistence of accruals. We find little evidence of 
accrual mispricing when firms experience economic losses, even though this is precisely when differences 
in persistence between accruals and cash flows are highest. In contrast, our results indicate that accruals 
are mispriced in gain years and not in loss years.
5
 
 We also modify the MT in order to allow the market response to accrual and cash flow surprises to 
differ. Prior research proposing earnings fixation as an explanation for the accrual anomaly assumes that 
earnings are sufficient for valuation and therefore the pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises is 
identical. At the same time, theoretical valuation models suggest that the pricing of accruals and cash 
flows should differ depending on their persistence and their ability to predict earnings (Ohlson 1999; 
Pope and Wang 2005). Consistent with Barth et al. (1999), our evidence based on the modified MT 
confirms that investors price the accrual and cash flow components of earnings surprises differently. 
While this result does not necessarily imply efficient pricing, it is contrary to the earnings fixation 
hypothesis.  
A further contribution of our study is to introduce recent panel regression techniques to the 
implementation of the MT. We document that market efficiency tests based on panel data are sensitive to 
the cross-sectional correlation of residuals, suggesting that clustering the standard errors in the MT by 
year is important. Year-by-year estimation based on Fama-MacBeth (1973) methods is an alternative 
approach that corrects for the cross-sectional correlation in the residuals, but has informational and 
statistical disadvantages relative to the MT based on pooled data
6
 (Kraft et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
Petersen (2009) shows that Fama-MacBeth methods result in biased standard errors in the presence of 
firm effects. In our panel estimation of the MT, when we cluster standard errors either by year, or by both 
firm and year, efficiency tests no longer reject the rational pricing of cash flows, even under a 
parsimonious model specification assuming identical pricing of accruals and cash flows and no 
                                                 
4
 Additionally if firms experience negative cash flow shocks, management is more likely to take action to reverse 
such shocks than when firms experience positive shocks. Therefore asymmetric persistence in cash flows is also 
likely to be observed empirically. 
5
 Throughout the paper we use the terminology gain and loss years. This labelling is not intended to indicate 
accounting gains and losses based on the sign of reported earnings but rather economic gains and losses, i.e. good 
news and bad news respectively. Both our terminology and the proxies we employ for economic gains and losses 
follow Ball and Shivakumar (2006).  
6
 Year-by-year cross-sectional regressions ignore time-series variation in explanatory variables and therefore they 
are not equivalent to pooled panel data estimation techniques (Cochrane 2005). 
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asymmetries in forecasting.
7
 This finding is contrary to the earnings fixation hypothesis which predicts 
that accruals are over-weighted and cash flows are under-weighted by the market.  
Overall, while the evidence we report does not necessarily rule out the mispricing of accruals, it is 
inconsistent with earnings fixation as the cause of the accrual anomaly. If the accrual anomaly does 
reflect mispricing then the nature of the market irrationality appears to be rooted in the processing of 
accruals information in gain years. On the other hand, if the accrual anomaly reflects un-modeled risk 
differences related to accruals, our results suggest that any accrual-related risk premium is significant 
when firms have experienced good news.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss our research design and 
extensions to the Mishkin test. We also discuss the alternative econometric techniques for the estimation 
of the MT. In section 3 we describe the sample and the data selection procedure. In section 4 we report 
the empirical results and finally, in section 5 we offer our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Research Design 
2.1    Expectations under timely loss recognition 
 Sloan (1996) tests the rationality of investor expectations with respect to accruals and cash flows 
using the MT and assuming the following forecasting and pricing equations: 
 EARNt+1 = α0 + α1ACCt + α2CFt + vt+1                                                                                                                               (1) 
 ARETt+1 = β(EARNt+1 – α0
*
 – α1
*
ACCt – α2
*
CFt) + εt+1                           (2) 
where EARN is earnings, ARET is abnormal returns, ACC is accruals and CF is cash flows. Equation (1) 
assumes that future earnings are linearly related to current period accruals and cash flows. Equation (2) 
relates abnormal returns to the earnings surprise defined using the earnings expectation model in equation 
(1). Rationality in forecasting earnings is tested by examining whether the restrictions α1
*
 = α1 and α2
*
 = 
α2 hold.  
Prior research shows that as a result of conditional accounting conservatism the persistence of earnings 
and accruals depends on whether firms experience good news or bad news about future cash flows in the 
reporting period. We incorporate this insight into the forecasting and pricing equations of the MT, using 
the four proxy variables for economic gains and losses suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2006). For 
each proxy we first estimate the following system of piecewise linear equations: 
                                                 
7
 A Stata ado file for two-way clustering in the MT is available from the authors on request. 
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  EARNt+1 = α0 + α01Dt + α1ACCt + α2CFt + α3ACCt . Dt + α4CFt . Dt + vt+1                                                                     (3) 
 ARETt+1 = β(EARNt+1 – α0
*
 – α01
*
Dt – α1
*
ACCt – α2
*
CFt – α3
*
ACCt . Dt  – α4
*
CFt . Dt) + εt+1                       (4) 
where D is a (0,1) dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the economic news proxy is negative. Using 
equation (3), we test for asymmetry in the persistence of accruals and cash flows by examining whether 
α3 = 0 and α4 = 0. Based on Basu (1997) we expect that accruals are less persistent in loss years relative to 
gain years, i.e. α3 < 0. Consistent with Sloan (1996) we expect that accruals are less persistent than cash 
flows in both gain years and loss years, i.e. α1 < α2 and (α1 + α3) < (α2 + α4).  
 Under the assumption that the pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises is identical and equal to β, 
rationality in forecasting earnings requires that the estimates α1
*, α2
*, (α1
* + α3
*) and (α2
* + α4
*
)
 
do not 
differ significantly from α1, α2, (α1
 + α3) and (α2
 + α4) respectively. If investors fixate on earnings and if 
the relative persistence of accruals versus cash flows is lower in loss states, then we should find that the 
mispricing of accruals is higher in loss states relative to gain states. This prediction is consistent with Shi 
and Zhang (2012), who find that the effectiveness of the accrual strategy increases in the differential 
persistence of accruals relative to cash flows.
8
  
Note that the forecasting equation (3) can be expanded further to include additional variables (see 
Kraft et al. 2007). In this paper, we intentionally use only ACC and CF as predictor variables in order to 
maintain comparability with the majority of papers using the MT (including Sloan (1996)) and to be able 
to reconcile our results with the accrual-based hedge portfolio returns. In the likelihood of omitted 
variables, the MT remains a valid test of market efficiency which can be applied in different states of the 
economy, although one cannot draw clear inferences about the source of any inefficiency (Sloan 1996; 
Kraft et al. 2007).   
 
2.2     Differential pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises 
 The earnings fixation hypothesis supported by Shi and Zhang (2012) and others suggests that the 
market does not discriminate among earnings components in valuation. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
tests of rationality based on equations (1) and (2) or based on equations (3) and (4) assume that the 
pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises is identical and is captured by the pricing parameter β.  If 
however accruals and cash flows attract different valuation weights, the coefficients on accrual and cash 
flow surprises will differ and the proposed explanation of naïve fixation will no longer be supported.   
                                                 
8
 Shi and Zhang (2012) measure the persistence of accruals relative to cash flows at the firm-level, using time-series 
regressions. On the contrary, we identify firms experiencing bad news and having relatively lower accrual 
persistence in the cross-section.  
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 We modify the MT by allowing the pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises to vary. This provides a 
direct test of the earnings fixation hypothesis conditional on separate forecasting models for each earnings 
component. We estimate the system of equations (5), (6) and (7): 
ACCt+1   = γ0 + γ1ACCt + γ2CFt + v1,t+1        (5) 
CFt+1        = δ0 + δ1ACCt + δ2CFt + v2,t+1        (6) 
ARETt+1 = β1(ΑCCt+1 – γ0
* – γ1
*
ACCt – γ2
* 
CFt) + β2(CFt+1 – δ0
*
 – δ1
*
ACCt – δ2
* 
CFt) + εt+1        (7) 
Equation (5) is the accrual forecasting equation and equation (6) is the cash flow forecasting equation. In 
equation (7) the parameter β1 (β2) captures the pricing of the accrual (cash flow) surprise. Rationality in 
forecasting accruals requires that γ1
*
 = γ1 and γ2
*
 = γ2. Similarly rationality in forecasting cash flows 
requires that 1
*
 = 1 and 2
*
 = 2. These restrictions are testable only if the relevant parameters are 
identified. If identification is not possible, only linear combinations of the rationality conditions are 
testable. In the case of equations (5)-(7), we are able to test the following linear combinations of the 
rationality conditions: 
(i) β1γ1
* + β2δ1
* = β1γ1 + β2δ1, which holds if investors rationally price accruals (i.e. γ1
*
 = γ1 and 1
*
 
= 1); and  
(ii) β1γ2
*+ β2δ2
* = β1γ2 + β2δ2, which holds if investors rationally price cash flows (i.e. γ2
*
 = γ2 and 
2
*
 = 2). 
In our empirical tests we re-write equation (7) as follows: 
ARETt+1 = β1ACCt+1 + β2CFt+1 – (κ0
*
 – κ1
*
ACCt – κ2
* 
CFt) + εt+1.   (8) 
where κ0
* = β1γ0
* + β2δ0
*, κ1
* = β1γ1
* + β2δ1
*
 and κ2
* = β1γ2
* + β2δ2
*
. We then test whether the rationality 
conditions κ1
* = β1γ1 + β2δ1
 for accruals and κ2
* = β1γ2 + β2δ2 for cash flows hold. Failure to reject these 
conditions is consistent with market rationality in the pricing of accruals and cash flows respectively.
9
  
 Although the system (5)-(7) provides a framework for testing the earnings fixation hypothesis, it 
ignores the asymmetric persistence of accruals arising from conditional conservatism. Therefore, the final 
MT specification we test combines the asymmetric persistence of earnings components with the 
differential pricing of the surprises to the components. We estimate equations (9)-(11):  
                                                 
9
 Testing for efficiency using these restrictions is equivalent to running a single step OLS regression of ARET t+1 on 
ACCt and CFt, as explained in Abel and Mishkin (1983) and Kraft et al. (2007). In the linear reduced form of system 
(1)-(2), the coefficients on ACCt and CFt are equal to β(α1 – α1
*
) and β(α2 – α2
*
) respectively. In the linear reduced 
form of system (3)-(5), the coefficients on ACCt and CFt are equal to β1(γ1 – γ1
*
) + β2(δ1 – δ1
*
) and β1(γ2 – γ2
*
) + 
β2(δ2 – δ2
*
) respectively. Therefore, an OLS test cannot distinguish between market efficiency and a variable being 
valuation irrelevant, i.e. β = 0, or β1, β2 = 0. In contrast the MT, by distinguishing between forecasting parameters 
and response coefficients, discriminates between market efficiency and valuation irrelevance.  
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     ACCt+1     = γ0 + γ01Dt + γ1ACCt + γ2CFt + γ3ACCt . Dt + γ4CFt . Dt + v1,t+1                                            (9) 
CFt+1          = δ0 + δ01Dt + δ1ACCt + δ2CFt + δ3ACCt . Dt + δ4CFt . Dt + v2,t+1                                         (10) 
ARETt+1 = β1(ΑCCt+1 – γ0
* – γ01
*
Dt – γ1
*
ACCt – γ2
*
CFt – γ3
*
ACCt . Dt – γ4
* 
CFt . Dt)  
                 + β2(CFt+1 – δ0
*
 – δ01
*
Dt – δ1
*
ACCt – δ2
*
CFt – δ3
*
ACCt . Dt – δ4
*
CFt . Dt) + εt+1        (11) 
 Based on equation (9), we test the hypothesis of asymmetry in the relation between future accruals and 
current earnings components by testing whether γ3 = 0 and γ4 = 0. Conservative accounting results in 
higher mean reversion of accruals in loss years relative to gain years. Hence, we predict that γ3 < 0. We 
also test the hypothesis of asymmetry in the relation between future cash flows and current earnings 
components in equation (10) by testing whether δ3 = 0 and δ4 = 0. Similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2006), 
we predict that the incremental coefficient on cash flows during loss years will be negative (δ3 < 0) 
because accruals in loss years incorporate capitalized multi-period cash flow effects.  
 In gain years, rationality in forecasting accruals requires that γ1
*
 = γ1 and γ2
*
 = γ2, and rationality in 
forecasting cash flows requires that 1
*
 = 1 and 2
*
 = 2. In loss years, rationality in forecasting accruals 
requires that γ1
*
 + γ3
*
 = γ1 + γ3 and γ2
*
 + γ4
*
 = γ2 + γ4, and rationality in forecasting cash flows requires 
that δ1
*
 + δ3
*
 = δ1 + δ3 and δ2
*
 + δ4
*
 = δ2 + δ4. Again these restrictions cannot be tested because the system 
is under-identified. However, we can test linear combinations of the rationality conditions. In the case of 
gain years the relevant conditions are identical to (i) and (ii) above. In the case of loss years the analogous 
efficiency conditions are:  
(iii) β1(γ1
*
 + γ3
*) + β2(δ1
*
 + δ3
*
) 
 = β1(γ1 + γ3) + β2(δ1 + δ3), which holds if investors rationally price 
accruals in loss years; and  
(iv) β1(γ2
*
 + γ4
*) + β2(δ2
*
 + δ4
*
) 
 = β1(γ2 + γ4) + β2(δ2 + δ4), which holds if investors rationally price 
cash flows in loss years. 
In our empirical tests we re-write equation (11) as follows: 
ARETt+1  = β1ACCt+1 + β2CFt+1 – (κ0
*
 – κ01
*
Dt – κ1
*
ACCt  – κ2
*
CFt 
                                                                   – κ3
*
ACCt . Dt – κ4
*
CFt . Dt) + εt+1    (12) 
where κ0
* = β1γ0
* + β2δ0
*, κ01
* = β1γ01
* + β2δ0
*, κ1
* = β1γ1
* + β2δ1
*, κ2
* = β1γ2
* + β2δ2
*, κ3
* = β1γ3
* + β2δ3
* and 
κ4
* = β1γ4
* + β2δ4
*
. We then test the rationality conditions pertaining to the gain states as before, namely 
κ1
* = β1γ1 + β2δ1
 for accruals and κ2
* = β1γ2 + β2δ2 for cash flows; and the additional rationality conditions 
relating to the loss years, namely κ1
* 
+ κ3
*
 = β1(γ1 + γ3) + β2(δ1 + δ3) for accruals and κ2
* 
+ κ4
*
 = β1(γ2 + γ4) 
+ β2(δ2 + δ4)
 
for cash flows. Failure to reject all these restrictions will be consistent with rationality in 
pricing the asymmetric persistence of accruals and cash flows. However, if rationality is rejected, a 
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detailed analysis of these conditions should reveal the possible sources of any apparent mispricing by 
identifying the earnings components and the states of the world under which mispricing is found.  
2.3     Loss proxies 
We employ the four proxies for fiscal-year gains and losses proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2006), 
including three book proxies based on the signs of cash flows (CF), the change in cash flows (ΔCF) and 
industry-adjusted cash flows (INDCF); and a market proxy based on the sign of abnormal returns 
(ARET).
10
 Each proxy has conceptual advantages and disadvantages, which are discussed in detail by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006). However, among the four proxies, market returns are more likely to measure 
the news reflected in contemporaneous accruals with error. Market values reflect unbooked items, 
including internally generated intangible assets and growth options, which can confound loss events that 
trigger accruals. More importantly, since our research is focused on potential market mispricing of 
accruals, there is a logical inconsistency in using returns as a loss proxy.  If our null hypothesis of market 
efficiency is rejected, then any inferences that use returns to identify the source of possible mispricing can 
be misleading. Therefore the discussion of our results focuses more on the three book proxies, although 
results based on the market proxy are also included for comparison with Ball and Shivakumar (2006). 
 
2.4  Estimation and standard errors 
 Petersen (2009) and Cameron et al. (2010) show that in the presence of within-cluster correlation of 
the regression residuals or the independent variable, the default OLS variance estimate is inflated by a 
factor of 
x u1 (N 1)     , where ρx is the within-cluster correlation of the independent variable x, ρu is 
the within-cluster correlation of the regression residuals u and N is the average size of clusters. Recently, 
a number of studies in the accounting literature have recognized that both classical OLS and White (1980) 
standard errors may yield unreliable test statistics when residuals are cross-sectionally or serially 
correlated, and this motivates our analysis in the accrual anomaly setting.  
The majority of papers using the MT to examine investor rationality rely on the default standard 
errors, based on the standard OLS variance estimator in each system equation. A small number of papers 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2004; Kraft et al. 2007) estimate the joint procedure of the MT using the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) approach, which controls for the cross-sectional correlation in the residuals but it ignores 
the time-series variation of the explanatory variables. Cameron et al. (2010) and Thompson (2011) 
                                                 
10
 Following Sloan (1996) we use size-adjusted returns as our measure of abnormal returns (ARET). Results are 
qualitatively the same when the market loss proxy is based on raw returns, or market-adjusted returns as in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006). 
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propose a variance estimator for panel data that is robust to simultaneous correlation along two 
dimensions, as follows:   
&firm time firm time whiteV V V V                                                                                           (13) 
where Vfirm&time is the variance estimator that clusters by both firm and time, Vfirm is the variance estimator 
that clusters by firm, Vtime is the variance estimator that clusters by time and VWhite is the White variance 
estimator that is robust to heteroskedasticity. We show that this estimator can be applied to the MT and 
can significantly affect market efficiency inferences.  
We follow the prior literature in estimating the different specifications of the MT by using non-linear 
least squares
11
 and we test the cross-equation restrictions using Wald tests. We modify test statistics and 
standard errors using cluster-robust standard errors, in line with the recommendations of Petersen (2009) 
and Gow et al. (2010). When estimating the MT, we draw inferences for market efficiency based on two-
way clustered standard errors and cluster-robust Wald statistics.
12
 To our knowledge this is the first paper 
to estimate MT test statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors appropriate for our panel data setting. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Data 
We obtain accounting and stock return data from the 2013 CRSP/Compustat merged database. Our 
sample includes all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms with available data, without restrictions on fiscal 
year-ends. In supplementary tests we examine December fiscal year-end firms only. Our test period 
includes the years 1989-2011, when cash flow statement data are available under SFAS 95.
13
 In tests 
where we use the change in cash flow as a loss proxy, we additionally require cash flow data to be 
available in 1988. Consistent with previous research we exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 
and 6999) because accruals are substantially different in nature for these firms.
14
  
We estimate size-adjusted buy and hold abnormal returns (ARET) as the difference between the 
annual buy and hold stock return and the annual buy and hold return on the CRSP size-matched 
portfolio.
15
 When a firm’s size assignment is not available in CRSP, we use the value-weighted CRSP 
                                                 
11
 In Stata this estimation is implemented using the nlsur command. 
12
 Details are available on request. 
13
 Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest that accruals estimates based on cash flow data are more reliable than estimates 
obtained using the balance sheet approach. 
14
 We use the historical SICH code from Compustat and the current SIC code when SICH is missing.  
15
 The exact files used for obtaining size portfolio returns are from the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) and 
are crsp.ermport2 for NYSE/AMEX firms and crsp.ermport3 for NASDAQ firms, as in Kraft et al. (2006). 
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market portfolio in computing abnormal returns. Returns are computed for the twelve month period 
starting four months after fiscal year-end, to ensure that all accounting variables are publicly available.  
When a firm delists, we use the delisting return in the delisting month and assume a return equal to the 
firm’s size-matched portfolio for the remainder of the year. If a delisting is due to liquidation (delisting 
codes 500 or between 520 and 584) and the delisting return is missing, the delisting return is set to -30% 
for NYSE/AMEX firms (Shumway 1997) and -55% for NASDAQ firms (Shumway and Warther 1999). 
To mitigate the possibility of selection bias discussed in Kraft et al. (2006), we set returns to zero in any 
month they are missing.
16
  
Following Hribar and Collins (2002), we compute accruals as ACC  EARN – CF17, where EARN is 
earnings before extraordinary items taken from the cash flow statement (IBC)
18
 and CF is operating  cash 
flows (OANCF) minus extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC). We deflate all 
accounting variables by average total assets. To mitigate the effects of outliers, we delete observations in 
the extreme top and bottom percentiles of the distributions of deflated EARN, CF and ACC in each year. 
Our final sample consists of 80,803 firm-year observations for 10,201 firms. Table 1 contains descriptive 
and correlation statistics for our main variables and Table 2 contains detailed definitions and correlation 
statistics of the loss proxies.  
 
4. Results 
4.1  Correcting standard errors for within-cluster correlation  
In Panel A of Table 3, we replicate the MT as it has been applied in prior research on the accrual 
anomaly (equations (1) and (2)), using our sample. Results are reported under six estimation approaches 
in order to show the relative importance of year and firm clustering effects when testing market efficiency 
with respect to accruals and cash flows. Consistent with Sloan (1996), column 1 shows evidence that 
accruals are less persistent than cash flows (α1 - α2 = - 0.356) but stock prices fail to reflect this 
differential persistence. In particular, accruals appear to be over-weighted (α1
*
 > α1) and cash flows under-
weighted (α2
*
 < α2), rejecting market efficiency. These findings are consistent with investors fixating on 
earnings and failing to anticipate the lower persistence of accruals relative to cash flows. Inferences 
remain the same when we correct standard errors for heteroskedasticity (column 2), for year fixed 
                                                 
16
 If the returns of a firm are missing for the whole 12-month period, the firm is excluded from the sample. 
17
 Our accrual definition is deliberately restricted to the non-cash component of earnings, given our focus on 
earnings fixation and the effects of conditional conservatism on accrual persistence. 
18
 Compustat item labels (XFP names) for accounting variables are in parentheses. 
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effects
19
 (column 3) and for serial correlation in the residuals (column 4). However, when we cluster the 
standard errors by year (column 5) and by both firm and year (column 6), standard errors increase 
significantly and the rational pricing of cash flows is no longer rejected. Accruals remain mispriced at the 
five percent level, but the results no longer support the earnings fixation hypothesis because this requires 
both accruals and cash flows to be mispriced.
20
 
Although clustering the standard errors by firm and year results in reliable inferences (Petersen 2009), 
it is still possible that our test statistics are overstated when different fiscal year-end firms are included in 
the sample. Since returns are measured four months after the fiscal year-end, annual return windows 
overlap for firms with different fiscal year-ends, resulting in “imperfect” time clustering. More 
importantly, given that returns are measured at different points in time, investors cannot exploit the 
information in these results using a trading strategy. For this reason, we repeat our tests for the sub-
sample of December fiscal year-end firms, for which the return interval starts at the beginning of May. 
The December year-end sub-sample consists of 48,662 observations.  
In Panel B of Table 3 we report results from estimating the symmetric two-equation MT (equations (1) 
and (2)) for December year-end firms. Similar to our previous results, columns 1-4 show evidence that 
accruals are over-weighted (α1
*
 > α1) and cash flows are under-weighted (α2
*
 < α2), rejecting market 
efficiency. However, when we cluster the standard errors by year (column 5) and by both firm and year 
(column 6), both accruals and cash flows appear rationally priced.
21
  
Overall, the results in Table 3 demonstrate that correcting for the cross-sectional dependence of the 
residuals in the MT can change inferences concerning market efficiency. In particular, if standard errors 
are not clustered by time the MT t-statistics are biased upwards to the point that market efficiency with 
respect to cash flows is incorrectly rejected in the full sample. Clustering standard errors by firm in 
addition to year does not change inferences, consistent with the argument that firm effects are likely to be 
negligible when returns are the dependent variable (Petersen 2009).  
  
                                                 
19
 We capture unobserved fixed time effects by demeaning all variables within each year.  
20
 Un-tabulated results show that the average persistence parameter λ1 on current earnings in the regression EARNt+1 
= λ0 + λ1EARNt + ut+1 is 0.773, indicating that α1 (= 0.525) < λ1 < α2 (= 0.880). Fixation on earnings implies that the 
pricing coefficient on both accruals (α1
*
) and cash flows (α2
*
) should be equal to 0.773, hence overweighting 
accruals and underweighting cash flows. 
21
 Un-tabulated results document that the lack of significance for the accrual mispricing for December fiscal year-
end firms is largely attributable to a decrease in the estimated mispricing of accruals (α1
*
 - α1) from 0.187 in Panel A 
to 0.148 in Panel B, rather than an increase in the standard errors for December fiscal year-end firms. 
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4.2  Incorporating timely loss recognition 
We now turn to the question of whether incorporating asymmetric persistence in the MT affects 
inferences and possible explanations concerning the accrual anomaly. In particular, we examine whether 
investors anticipate the lower persistence of accruals in loss years arising from timely loss recognition. In 
Table 4 we report estimates of the two-equation MT after allowing for asymmetry in the persistence of 
accruals and cash flows conditional on loss and gain states (equations (3) and (4)). We employ economic 
loss proxies as defined in Table 2, based on the signs of CF, ΔCF, INDCF and ARET and we provide 
results based on all four proxies. However, because returns are more likely to misclassify good/bad news 
accruals if the information reflected in accruals is mispriced, we focus our discussion on results pertaining 
to the book proxies rather than ARET. To conserve space, we report results based on two-way clustered 
standard errors and year fixed effects, in light of the results reported in Table 3 indicating the sensitivity 
of inferences to the estimation of standard errors. Furthermore, we report results only for the full sample, 
but we also discuss our results based on December year-end firms. 
The results in Table 4 provide strong evidence of asymmetry in the persistence of accruals. The 
persistence of accruals in gain states (α1) averages approximately 0.56 across loss proxies. For every loss 
proxy, the incremental coefficient α3 on ACC during loss years is significantly negative and economically 
substantial (e.g. up to one-fifth of the coefficient on accruals in non-loss years when INDCF < 0 is used as 
the loss proxy). This evidence is consistent with the transitory nature of accruals in loss years predicted 
under timely loss recognition. Similar to accruals, cash flows also display asymmetric persistence. For 
every loss proxy, cash flows in loss years are more persistent than cash flows in gain years, i.e. α4 > 0. 
This differential persistence is statistically significant at the five percent level under three proxies.  
To provide an indication of the differential persistence between accruals and cash flows in different 
states, we compare statistically the persistence coefficients on the two earnings components in Table 4. 
For every loss proxy, accruals are less persistent than cash flows in both good news states (α1 – α2 < 0) 
and bad news states ((α1 + α3) – (α2 + α4) < 0). The persistence of accruals relative to cash flows declines 
when moving from the gain state to the loss state (α3 – α4 < 0 in all cases). This is relevant for testing the 
earnings fixation hypothesis. If earnings fixation explains the accrual mispricing, as argued by Shi and 
Zhang (2012), we would expect evidence of greater mispricing in loss years, when the differential 
persistence between accruals and cash flows is higher. Additionally if investors fixate on earnings, cash 
flows should also be mispriced, with the mispricing being higher in loss years.  
The results provide evidence contradicting the earnings fixation hypothesis. When CF and INDCF are 
used as loss proxies, investors seem to at least partly understand the lower persistence of accruals in loss 
years (α3
*
 < 0). In all cases except for the ARET proxy, we fail to reject efficiency in the pricing of 
12 
 
accruals in loss years at the five percent significance level.
22
 In contrast, we do reject efficiency in the 
pricing of accruals in gain years, when differences in the persistence between accruals and cash flows are 
less pronounced. The difference in the magnitude of accrual mispricing between loss and gain years (α3
* 
- 
α3) is negative, contrary to the earnings fixation hypothesis. Only when the loss proxy is based on ARET 
do the results provide evidence of more significant accrual mispricing in loss years, consistent with Jiang 
(2007). However, even here the results fail to support the earnings fixation hypothesis because the accrual 
anomaly is significant in loss years only – there is no evidence that accruals are mispriced in gain years 
even though the persistence of accruals and cash flows differs.  
Un-tabulated results for the December fiscal year-end firms continue to confirm the transitory nature 
of accruals in loss years. For every loss proxy other than CF the incremental coefficient α3 on ACC during 
loss years is significantly negative and economically significant. Under all loss proxies, the persistence of 
accruals relative to cash flows declines in moving from the gain state to the loss state (α3 – α4 < 0 in all 
cases). Similar to the results in Table 4, under the CF, ΔCF and INDCF loss proxies, we reject the 
efficiency in pricing of accruals only in gain years, when differences in the persistence between accruals 
and cash flows are less pronounced. Again, only when the loss proxy is based on ARETt do the results 
provide evidence of significant accrual mispricing in loss years. These findings confirm our previous 
results and fail to support the earnings fixation hypothesis. 
Overall, when examining the results for the four loss proxies, we fail to find a case where the 
predictions of the earnings fixation hypothesis are supported. In other words, in no case is there evidence 
of both significant accrual mispricing in gain years and mispricing being greater in loss years. Our results 
demonstrate that the explanation of the accrual anomaly is more complex than naïve earnings fixation.
23
  
 
4.3  Incorporating differential pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises 
We now modify the MT to allow the pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises to differ, providing a 
more direct test of the earnings fixation hypothesis. At this stage, we assume that the forecasting 
equations for accruals and cash flows are symmetric. In Table 5, we report results from estimating the 
three-equation MT (equations (5), (6) and (7)) for the full sample only, but we discuss results also for the 
December fiscal year-end sample. To allow for comparability with the results in Table 3, we report 
estimates under the six estimation approaches.  
                                                 
22
 Under two loss proxies, the efficient pricing of accruals in loss years is rejected at the ten percent level. 
23
 The results in Table 4 are qualitatively the same across the loss proxies when we repeat our tests on a constant 
sample of 70,759 observations including all fiscal year end firms and on a constant sample of 42,587 including 
December fiscal year-end firms only.  Results are available on request. 
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In the three-equation MT specification, γ1 and γ2 are the forecasting parameters on ACCt and CFt 
respectively when we forecast ACCt+1, while δ1 and δ2 are the forecasting parameters on ACCt and CFt 
respectively when we forecast CFt+1. The forecasting equations results show that accruals and cash flows 
are both incrementally useful in predicting future accruals and future cash flows. Accrual forecasts are 
more sensitive to current period accruals than to current period cash flows (γ1 > γ2), although accruals 
display a relatively high level of mean reversion (γ1 is approximately 0.3). In contrast, cash flow forecasts 
are more sensitive to current period cash flows than to current period accruals and the mean reversion of 
cash flows is  relatively low  (δ2 is approximately 0.76).
24
 Accruals significantly predict future cash flows 
(δ1 = 0.225), consistent with the role of accruals in reflecting revisions in cash flow expectations. Overall, 
these results confirm that accruals and cash flows have different persistence properties and they capture 
different information for predicting each other. Under these circumstances it is likely that rational stock 
market participants would value accruals and cash flows differently and that surprises in the two earnings 
components would also be priced differently. 
The pricing equation results in Table 5 confirm this prediction. After the inclusion of year fixed effects 
the response coefficient on ACC (β1) is 1.058 while the CF response coefficient is 1.435 (columns 3-6), 
indicating that CF surprises are valued higher than ACC surprises. Under all approaches to estimating 
standard errors, the difference between the pricing parameters β1 - β2 is highly statistically significant. 
This result indicates that investors distinguish between news relating to accruals and news relating to cash 
flows, contrary to the earnings fixation hypothesis. Un-tabulated results from estimating the three-
equation MT for December fiscal year-end firms are qualitatively the same. 
Although under this MT specification we can identify the forecasting parameters on ACC (γ1 and δ1) 
and CF (γ2 and δ2), the corresponding pricing parameters (γ1
*
 and δ1
*) and (γ2
*
 and δ2
*
) are under-
identified. For this reason, we test market efficiency by testing whether linear combinations of the rational 
forecasting coefficients equal linear combinations of the corresponding pricing coefficients, as described 
in Section 2.1. Similar to the results reported in Panel A of Table 3, the market efficiency tests in Table 5 
demonstrate that after clustering the standard errors by year, or by firm and year, we no longer reject the 
rational pricing of cash flows. Results continue to indicate that accruals are mispriced, although market 
efficiency is only rejected at the five percent level. However, un-tabulated results for the December fiscal 
year-end sample show that after clustering the standard errors by year, or by firm and year, both accruals 
and cash flows are rationally priced, consistent with the results of Panel B in Table 3.  
                                                 
24
 Untabulated F-tests show that γ1 is significantly different from γ2 and δ1 is significantly different from δ2. 
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Overall, the results in Table 5 provide further evidence on whether the earnings fixation hypothesis 
can explain the accrual anomaly. In particular, our findings indicate that once differential pricing of 
accruals and cash flows is introduced, the earnings fixation hypothesis is not supported. Furthermore, 
clustering the standard errors by year in the modified three-equation MT significantly affects market 
efficiency inferences and the results no longer reject the rational pricing of cash flows.  
 
 
4.4  Incorporating timely loss recognition with earnings components 
We now examine the effects of allowing for the differential pricing of accrual and cash flow surprises 
when persistence is asymmetric. Table 6 show results obtained by estimating the three-equation MT 
(equations (9), (10) and (12)) using the full sample only.  Because the results for the December fiscal 
year-end sample are qualitatively similar, our discussion focuses only on the full sample. 
The forecasting equation results in Table 6 indicate that accruals and cash flows contain 
complementary information for forecasting the earnings components. Focusing first on the accrual 
forecasting equation, consistent with predictions based on timely loss recognition we find that in loss 
years accruals have considerably lower persistence than in gain years. For every loss proxy, the 
incremental coefficient γ3 on ACCt during loss years is significantly negative and economically important. 
For example, when CF is used as the loss proxy the change in accrual persistence in loss years is about 
one-third of the coefficient on accruals in gain years. While we do not have theoretical predictions 
concerning the incremental forecasting role of cash flows in predicting accruals, Table 6 also shows that 
cash flows are informative for future accruals (γ2 > 0). However, there is no systematic evidence that the 
forecasting role of cash flows for accruals is asymmetric (γ4 is insignificant in two out of four cases).  
Turning to the cash flow forecasting equation, cash flows display high levels of persistence across all 
loss proxies (δ2 is between 0.65 and 0.78 across the different proxies). Moreover, it appears that in loss 
years cash flow persistence tends to be higher than in gain years (δ4 is significantly positive under two 
loss proxies). Further, as expected, accruals are a significant predictor for future cash flows (δ1 is positive 
in all cases).  However, in our sample there is only weak evidence of a significant incremental forecasting 
role of accruals for future cash flows in loss years (δ3 is significantly negative in only one case).   
In summary, the forecasting results of Table 6 suggest that the cash flow information complements 
accruals in forecasting both future accruals and future cash flows, and that asymmetry in accrual 
persistence is an important feature of the dynamics of accruals. The dynamics linking accruals and cash 
flows suggest that the pricing of the two earnings components is complex and depends on the differential 
persistence and forecasting relevance of the two components. 
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The pricing equation results confirm the findings in Table 5 that investors respond differently to 
accrual and cash flow surprises. Specifically, for every loss proxy, the accrual response coefficient is 
significantly lower than the cash flow response coefficient (β1 < β2), again indicating that investors are 
able to differentiate between accruals and cash flows. Inferences regarding the rational pricing of accruals 
and cash flows in gain and loss years are identical to those drawn from the asymmetric two-equation MT 
and fail to support a higher accrual mispricing in loss years, when the relative mean reversion of accruals 
is higher. In contrast, accrual mispricing appears to be driven by gain years. Again, this finding challenges 
the earnings fixation hypothesis explanation for the accrual anomaly.
25
  
 
4.5  Portfolio analysis 
In this subsection, we use portfolio analysis to test the robustness and the potential usefulness of our 
MT results. In particular, we test whether the returns to the accrual strategy are more pronounced in states 
of the world where accruals are found to be mispriced using the MT. Based on our results in Tables 5 and 
6, we expect that, on average, the hedge portfolio returns on the accrual strategy will be significantly 
greater in years of economic gains relative to years of economic losses, when book-based measures are 
used as gain/loss proxies. Alternatively, when the gain/loss proxy is based on returns, our MT results 
suggest that the hedge portfolio returns on the accrual strategy will be more pronounced in years of 
economic losses.   
 To estimate the hedge portfolio returns we first classify our sample firms into deciles based on their 
accruals in each year and calculate yearly average one-year-ahead returns for each decile. We then 
compute averages of the decile returns over our sample period, for the full sample, and for gain and loss 
years separately.
26
 We also compute the hedge portfolio return, i.e. the return to a portfolio with a long 
position in the lowest accrual decile and a short position in the highest accrual decile. In order to test a 
realistic accrual strategy, we restrict the sample to December fiscal year-end firms, similar to Sloan 
(1996) and Lev and Nissim (2006). To avoid the look-ahead bias inherent in the MT, we implement the 
strategy on a larger sample of 56,156 observations, where we require current period accruals to be 
                                                 
25
 The results in Table 6 are qualitatively the same across the loss proxies when we repeat our tests on a constant 
sample of 70,759 observations including all fiscal year end firms and on a constant sample of 42,587 including 
December fiscal year-end firms only.  Results are available on request. 
26
 Due to the high correlations between accruals and the gain/loss proxies, we choose to classify stocks into 
portfolios before conditioning on gain and losses. Although this approach results in unequal number of stocks across 
deciles in each year, the portfolios that we obtain are sufficiently large for the purposes of statistical testing 
(Maximum = 286, Minimum = 23 and Mean = 118). Our results remain qualitatively the same if we classify firms 
into portfolios after conditioning on gains/losses.  
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available, but not one-year-ahead earnings.
27
 The sample is then allowed to vary depending on the 
availability of each gain/loss proxy. 
 The results are reported in Table 7. The first ten columns present the average returns for each accrual 
decile and the column “Hedge” shows the hedge portfolio return that is long in the lowest accrual decile 
and short in the highest accrual decile. The results show that the average return to the accrual strategy 
over our sample period is 3.9% but insignificant (p-value = 0.296), as in Shi and Zhang (2012). This 
finding is consistent with the decline in the accrual anomaly the recent years (Green et al. 2011). When 
we examine the hedge portfolio return for gain years only, the return rises to 10.4% (p-value = 0.021) 
under the CF proxy, to 6.8% (p-value = 0.103) under the ΔCF proxy and to 11.2% (p-value = 0.007) 
under the INDCF proxy. Contrary to the results in the MT, a strategy based on accruals in loss years 
identified using ARET yields a hedge return of 5.3% (p-value = 0.199). Un-tabulated results show that 
when we require future earnings, accruals and cash flows to be non-missing (as in the MT), the same 
strategy gives a marginally significant hedge return of 8.3% (p-value = 0.056). This difference in hedge 
returns demonstrates the importance of validating results obtained from the MT on a sample where 
survival is not required. Overall, our results suggest that the returns to the accrual anomaly increase in 
magnitude and significance for firms that are in good states, i.e. when CFt, ΔCFt or INDCFt are positive. 
These findings validate the usefulness of the MT in providing insights into the sources of market 
inefficiencies and provide evidence of significant positive hedge returns that might be exploitable by 
investors interested in trading on the accruals anomaly. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrate that the test developed by Mishkin (1983) to examine the efficient 
pricing of accruals and cash flows can be more informative when it allows for the differential pricing of 
accrual and cash flow surprises; and when it allows for the effects of timely loss recognition on the 
persistence of accruals and cash flows. We also show that inferences from the MT when applied to panel 
data are sensitive to the treatment of correlation in residuals within years. The additional insights derived 
from the enhanced MT shed new light on the channels through which the apparent mispricing of accruals 
occurs.  
We document a series of results indicating that the earnings fixation hypothesis is unlikely to explain 
the accrual anomaly. First, the pricing of accrual surprises is significantly lower than the pricing of cash 
flow surprises. This finding is consistent with the lower persistence of accruals and suggests that investors 
                                                 
27
 Additionally, we do not delete extreme observations in this sample. 
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rationally distinguish between the accrual and the cash flow component of earnings, contradicting the 
earnings fixation hypothesis. Second, when allowance is made for the timely recognition of economic 
losses relative to gains we find evidence that accruals (cash flows) in loss years are less (more) persistent 
than accruals in gain years. As a result, the differential persistence of accruals relative to cash flows in 
loss years becomes the highest. Yet the mispricing of accruals is concentrated in gain years, contrary to 
predictions of the earnings fixation hypothesis.  
Finally, we demonstrate that the application of the MT in accounting is sensitive to the cross-sectional 
correlation of the residuals. While the default OLS standard errors in the MT reject the rational pricing of 
both accruals and cash flows, when we cluster the standard errors in the MT either by year, or by firm and 
year, the results no longer reject rational expectations with respect to cash flows.  
While our results reject the fixation hypothesis as an explanation for the accrual anomaly, they do not 
explain why future returns are related to accruals in years of economic gains. Further research is 
necessary to distinguish between mispricing and risk explanations for the return predictability of accruals 
conditional on economic gains. Another interesting direction for future research would be to incorporate 
broader definitions of accruals in our testing framework, including operating, investing and financing 
components, which in aggregate have been shown to predict future returns more strongly (Richardson et 
al. 2005).  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Distribution of the main variables 
  Mean St.dev 25% Median 75% 
EARNt+1 -0.034 0.200 -0.054 0.028 0.071 
ACCt+1 -0.072 0.121 -0.108 -0.054 -0.013 
CFt+1 0.038 0.162 -0.001 0.070 0.127 
EARNt -0.024 0.189 -0.043 0.031 0.074 
ACCt -0.062 0.113 -0.103 -0.051 -0.008 
CFt 0.038 0.163 -0.003 0.070 0.128 
RETt+1 0.144 0.836 -0.279 0.021 0.349 
ARETt+1 -0.006 0.790 -0.383 -0.100 0.189 
 
Panel B: Correlations  
  EARNt+1 ACCt+1 CFt+1 EARNt ACCt CFt RETt+1 ARETt+1 
EARNt+1 1 0.590 0.796 0.732 0.230 0.691 0.133 0.142 
ACCt+1 0.405 1 -0.019 0.286 0.272 0.144 0.085 0.088 
CFt+1 0.673 -0.264 1 0.692 0.080 0.748 0.101 0.110 
EARNt 0.715 0.242 0.546 1 0.515 0.805 -0.013 0.000 
ACCt 0.165 0.311 -0.056 0.374 1 -0.094 -0.047 -0.038 
CFt 0.587 0.010 0.636 0.661 -0.310 1 0.018 0.026 
RETt+1 0.293 0.096 0.245 0.089 -0.029 0.137 1 0.947 
ARETt+1 0.309 0.095 0.256 0.102 -0.022 0.143 0.855 1 
 
The table is based on the original sample of 80,803 firm-year observations for the period 1989-2011. Panel A reports 
the distribution of the main variables and Panel B reports Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
correlation statistics. The variables are defined as follows: EARN is income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations deflated by average total assets, CF is operating cash flow obtained from the cash flow 
statement minus extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by average total assets, ACC is accruals 
defined as EARN minus CF, ARET is the difference between a firm’s annual buy and hold return over a 12-month 
period beginning four months after the firms’ fiscal-year-end and the buy and hold return of the CRSP size-matched 
portfolio for the same 12-month period. 
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Table 2: Proxies for Gains and Losses 
 
Panel A: Proxy definitions 
Gain/Loss Proxy Definition 
Sign of the level of cash flows Dt = 1 if CFt < 0, 0 otherwise 
where CFt = Cash flows in year t 
 
Sign of change in cash flows 
 
Dt = 1 if ΔCFt < 0, 0 otherwise 
where ΔCFt = CFt - CFt-1 
 
Industry-adjusted cash flows Dt = 1 if INDCFt < 0, 0 otherwise 
where INDCFt = CFt – median CFt in the three-digit SIC 
industry 
 
Abnormal returns Dt = 1 if ARETt < 0, 0 otherwise 
where ARETt = size-adjusted returns in year t 
 
 
Panel B: Correlations for gain and loss proxies 
  CFt ΔCFt INDCFt ARETt 
CFt 1 0.328 0.917 0.091 
ΔCFt 0.352 1 0.345 0.117 
INDCFt 0.867 0.346 1 0.097 
ARETt 0.234 0.136 0.212 1 
 
The table is based on the original sample of 80,803 firm-year observations for the period 1989-2011. Panel A 
provides the definitions of the four loss proxies and Panel B reports Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below 
diagonal) correlation statistics of the proxies. The proxy variables are based on the following underlying variables: 
CF is operating cash flow obtained from the cash flow statement minus extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations deflated by average total assets, ARET is the difference between a firm’s annual buy and hold return over 
a 12-month period beginning four months after the firms’ fiscal-year-end and the buy and hold return of the CRSP 
size-matched portfolio for the same 12-month period.  
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Table 3: The two-equation MT: Linear forecasting models 
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1ACCt + α2CFt + vt+1 
ARETt+1 = β(EARNt+1 – α0
*
 – α1
*
ACCt – α2
* 
CFt) + εt+1 
 
Panel A: All fiscal year-end firms 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Forecasting equation 
α0 -0.035 -0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
α1 0.529 0.529 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α2 0.885 0.885 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α1 - α2 -0.356 -0.356 -0.355 -0.355 -0.355 -0.355 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Pricing equation 
α*0 -0.014 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
α*1 0.733 0.733 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α*2 0.794 0.794 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.793 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
β 1.223 1.223 1.224 1.224 1.224 1.224 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market efficiency restrictions 
ACC 0.205 0.205 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 
α1
* 
- α1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.037) 
CF -0.091 -0.091 -0.087 -0.087 -0.087 -0.087 
α2
* 
- α2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.330) (0.329) 
 
 
Standard errors Standard White White By firm By year Two way 
Year demeaning No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3: The two-equation MT: Linear forecasting models (cont.…) 
 
Panel B: December fiscal year-end firms 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Forecasting equation 
α0 -0.037 -0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
α1 0.523 0.523 0.517 0.517 0.517 0.517 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α2 0.895 0.895 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α1 - α2 -0.372 -0.372 -0.372 -0.372 -0.372 -0.372 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pricing equation 
α*0 -0.017 -0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
α*1 0.696 0.696 0.665 0.665 0.665 0.665 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α*2 0.812 0.812 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
β 1.163 1.163 1.152 1.152 1.152 1.152 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market efficiency restrictions 
ACC 0.173 0.173 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 
α1
* 
- α1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.125) (0.124) 
CF -0.083 -0.083 -0.080 -0.080 -0.080 -0.080 
α2
* 
- α2 (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.481) (0.480) 
 
 
Standard errors Standard White White By firm By year Two way 
Year demeaning No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The table reports results from the two-equation MT for the time period 1989-2011. Panel A refers to all fiscal year-
end firms (80,803 observations) and Panel B refers to December fiscal year-end firms (48,662 observations). The 
sample in each panel remains the same for each specification. The variables are defined as follows: EARN is income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by average total assets, CF is operating cash flow 
obtained from the cash flow statement minus extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by average 
total assets, ACC is accruals defined as EARN minus CF, ARET is the difference between a firm’s annual buy and 
hold return over a 12-month period beginning four months after the firms’ fiscal-year-end and the buy and hold 
return of the CRSP size-matched portfolio for the same 12-month period. P-values are reported in parentheses. In 
columns 3-6, p-values for the intercepts are not applicable, because by year demeaning results in zero intercepts by 
construction. 
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Table 4: The two-equation MT: Piece-wise linear forecasting models, all fiscal year-end firms 
EARNt+1 = α0 + α01Dt + α1ACCt + α2CFt + α3 ACCt . Dt + α4 CFt . Dt + vt+1 
ARETt+1 = β(EARNt+1 – α0
*
 – α01
*
Dt – α1
*
ACCt – α2
*
CFt – α3
*
ACCt . Dt – α4
*
CFt . Dt) + εt+1 
 
Loss proxy CFt<0 ΔCFt<0 INDCFt<0 ARETt<0 
Forecasting equation 
α1 0.543 0.541 0.591 0.562 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α2 0.721 0.896 0.779 0.850 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α3 -0.077 -0.038 -0.121 -0.072 
 
(0.017) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
α4 0.173 0.022 0.141 0.023 
 
(0.000) (0038) (0.000) (0.086) 
Differential persistence 
α1 - α2 -0.178 -0.355 -0.189 -0.288 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α1 + α3 - (α2 + α4) -0.428 -0.415 -0.451 -0.382 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α3 – α4 -0.250 -0.060 -0.262 -0.094 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pricing equation     
α1
*
 0.875 0.770 0.868 0.613 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α2
*
 0.783 0.769 0.849 0.715 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α3
*
 -0.321 -0.072 -0.251 0.101 
  (0.010) (0.189) (0.000) (0.243) 
α4
*
 0.118 0.152 0.002 0.089 
 
(0.375) (0.037) (0.979) (0.188) 
β 1.221 1.305 1.228 1.243 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 4 (cont….) 
 
Market efficiency restrictions 
ACC| gain 0.331 0.229 0.278 0.052 
α1
* 
- α1 (0.022) (0.005) (0.010) (0.536) 
ACC| loss 0.087 0.195 0.148 0.224 
α1
* 
+ α3
* 
- (α1 + α3) (0.175) (0.072) (0.072) (0.013) 
CF| gain 0.062 -0.128 0.069 -0.134 
(α2
* 
- α2) (0.623) (0.071) (0.435) (0.043) 
CF| loss 0.006 0.003 -0.070 -0.068 
α2
* 
+ α4
* 
- (α2 + α4) (0.946) (0.981) (0.487) (0.500) 
Incremental ACC and CF mispricing 
ACC -0.244 -0.034 -0.130 0.173 
α3
* 
- α3 (0.070) (0.548) (0.047) (0.049) 
CF -0.055 0.130 -0.140 0.066 
α4
* 
- α4 (0.702) (0.074) (0.033) (0.366) 
 
N(full sample) 80,803 71,233 80,287 80,782 
N(loss) 20,646 35,807 39,007 48,180 
 
The table reports results from the two-equation MT that incorporates conditional conservatism. The MT is estimated 
for all fiscal year-end firms in the time period 1989-2011 (80,803 observations). The variables are defined as 
follows: EARN is income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by average total assets, 
CF is operating cash flow obtained from the cash flow statement minus extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations deflated by average total assets, ACC is accruals defined as EARN minus CF, ARET is the difference 
between a firm’s annual buy and hold return over a 12-month period beginning four months after the firms’ fiscal-
year-end and the buy and hold return of the CRSP size-matched portfolio for the same 12-month period. D is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for economic losses and zero otherwise. The proxies for economic losses 
are negative values of either CF, ΔCF (change in CF), INDCF (industry-adjusted CF) and ARET. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm-year after by year demeaning of the variables. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5: The three-equation MT: Linear forecasting models, all fiscal year-end firms 
 
ACCt+1 = γ0 + γ1ACCt + γ2CFt + v1,t+1 
CFt+1 = δ0 + δ1ACCt + δ2CFt + v2,t+1 
ARETt+1 = β1ACCt+1 + β2CFt+1 – (κ0
*
 – κ1
*
ACCt – κ2
* 
CFt) + εt+1 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Forecasting equations 
γ0 -0.058 -0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
γ1 0.310 0.310 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
γ2 0.127 0.127 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
δ0 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
δ1 0.218 0.218 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
δ2 0.758 0.758 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pricing equation 
κ0
*
 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.580) (0.603) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
κ1
*
 0.892 0.892 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.868 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
κ2
*
 1.118 1.118 1.110 1.110 1.110 1.110 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
β1   1.051 1.051 1.058 1.058 1.058 1.058 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
β2 1.446 1.446 1.435 1.435 1.435 1.435 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
β1 - β2 -0.395 -0.395 -0.377 -0.377 -0.377 -0.377 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market efficiency restrictions 
ACC 0.251 0.251 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 
κ1
* 
- (γ1β1 + δ1β2) (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.044) 
CF -0.112 -0.112 -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 
κ2
* 
- (γ2β1 + δ2β2) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.320) (0.319) 
 
 
Standard errors Standard White White By firm By year Two way 
Year demeaning No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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The table reports results from the three-equation MT, estimated for all fiscal year-end firms in the time period 1989-
2011 (80,803 observations). The sample in each panel remains the same for each specification. The variables are 
defined as follows: EARN is income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by average 
total assets, CF is operating cash flow obtained from the cash flow statement minus extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations deflated by average total assets, ACC is accruals defined as EARN minus CF, ARET is the 
difference between a firm’s annual buy and hold return over a 12-month period beginning four months after the 
firms’ fiscal-year-end and the buy and hold return of the CRSP size-matched portfolio for the same 12-month 
period. P-values are reported in parentheses. In columns 3-6, p-values for the intercepts are not applicable, because 
by year demeaning results in zero intercepts by construction. 
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Table 6: The three-equation MT: Piece-wise linear forecasting models, all fiscal year-end firms 
ACCt+1     = γ0 + γ01Dt + γ1ACCt + γ2CFt + γ3ACCt . Dt + γ4CFt . Dt + v1,t+1 
CFt+1        = δ0 + δ01Dt + δ1ACCt + δ2CFt + δ3ACCt . Dt + δ4CFt . Dt + v2,t+1 
ARETt+1     = β1ACCt+1 + β2CFt+1 – (κ0
*
 – κ01
*
Dt – κ1
*
ACCt  – κ2
*
CFt – κ3
*
ACCt . Dt – κ4
*
CFt . Dt) + εt+1 
 
Loss proxy CFt<0 ΔCFt<0 INDCFt<0 ARETt<0 
Forecasting equations 
γ1 0.363 0.337 0.360 0.332 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
γ2 0.074 0.116 0.051 0.087 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
γ3 -0.121 -0.040 -0.092 -0.062 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
γ4 0.026 0.004 0.071 0.037 
 
(0.190) (0.734) (0.000) (0.004) 
δ1 0.180 0.204 0.231 0.229 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
δ2 0.647 0.780 0.728 0.763 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
δ3 0.044 0.002 -0.029 -0.009 
 
(0.023) (0.869) (0.051) (0.596) 
δ4 0.148 0.018 0.071 -0.014 
 
(0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.333) 
Pricing equation     
κ1
*
 1.045 0.993 1.055 0.755 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
κ2
*
 1.083 1.166 1.194 1.035 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
κ3
*
 -0.362 -0.086 -0.299 0.134 
 
(0.020) (0.223) (0.001) (0.231) 
κ4
*
 0.172 0.202 0.005 0.102 
 
(0.287) (0.049) (0.941) (0.240) 
β1 1.051 1.130 1.055 1.076 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
β2 1.437 1.540 1.449 1.454 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
β1 - β2 -0.386 -0.410 -0.394 -0.378 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 6 (cont….) 
Market efficiency restrictions 
ACC| gain 0.404 0.298 0.341 0.064 
κ1
* 
- (γ1β1 + δ1β2) (0.027) (0.008) (0.015) (0.533) 
ACC| loss 0.106 0.254 0.181 0.279 
κ1
*+κ3
*
-[(γ1+γ3)β1+(δ1+δ3)β2] (0.177) (0.080) (0.078) (0.019) 
CF| gain 0.076 -0.167 0.085 -0.167 
κ2
* 
- (γ2β1+δ2β2) (0.625) (0.063) (0.442) (0.038) 
CF| loss 0.008 0.004 -0.086 -0.085 
κ2
*+κ4
*
-[(γ2+γ4)β1+(δ2+δ4)β2] (0.946) (0.981) (0.480) (0.493) 
Incremental ACC and CF mispricing  
ACC -0.298 -0.044 -0.160 0.215 
κ3
* 
- (γ3β1+δ3β2) (0.079) (0.549) (0.057) (0.064) 
CF -0.068 0.170 -0.171 0.082 
κ4
* 
- (γ4β1+δ4β2) (0.701) (0.087) (0.031) (0.375) 
N(full sample) 80,803 71,233 80,287 80,782 
N(loss) 20,646 35,807 39,007 48,180 
 
The table reports results from the three-equation MT that incorporates conditional conservatism. The MT is 
estimated for all fiscal year-end firms in the time period 1989-2011 (80,803 observations). The variables are defined 
as follows: EARN is income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by average total assets, 
CF is operating cash flow obtained from the cash flow statement minus extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations deflated by average total assets, ACC is accruals defined as EARN minus CF deflated by average total 
assets, ARET is the difference between a firm’s annual buy and hold return over a 12-month period beginning four 
months after the firms’ fiscal-year-end and the buy and hold return of the CRSP size-matched portfolio for the same 
12-month period. D is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for economic losses and zero otherwise. The 
proxies for economic losses are negative values of either CF, ΔCF (change in CF), INDCF (industry-adjusted CF) 
and ARET. Standard errors are clustered by firm-year after by year demeaning of the variables. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Portfolio tests based on December fiscal year end firms  
 
Ranking on ACC 
  Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest Hedge 
Full sample -0.031 0.021 0.023 0.007 0.011 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.020 -0.070 0.039 
n=56,156 (0.425) (0.571) (0.378) (0.613) (0.329) (0.669) (0.829) (0.646) (0.209) (0.017) (0.296) 
 
           CFt < 0 Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest Hedge 
Gain 0.058 0.053 0.048 0.027 0.023 0.006 0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.046 0.104 
n = 40,066 (0.142) (0.105) (0.054) (0.029) (0.072) (0.679) (0.201) (0.508) (0.372) (0.041) (0.021) 
Loss -0.133 -0.052 -0.045 -0.108 -0.054 -0.050 -0.060 0.012 -0.028 -0.067 -0.066 
n = 16,090 (0.007) (0.402) (0.444) (0.019) (0.156) (0.301) (0.224) (0.781) (0.435) (0.096) (0.187) 
            ΔCFt < 0 Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest Hedge 
Gain -0.006 0.034 0.038 0.011 0.014 -0.012 0.001 -0.036 -0.018 -0.075 0.068 
n = 26,379 (0.849) (0.278) (0.093) (0.430) (0.248) (0.279) (0.927) (0.077) (0.424) (0.048) (0.103) 
Loss -0.052 0.001 0.020 0.014 0.016 0.008 0.010 0.015 -0.016 -0.054 0.002 
n = 26,470 (0.304) (0.985) (0.602) (0.511) (0.297) (0.569) (0.513) (0.386) (0.320) (0.046) (0.958) 
            INDCFt < 0 Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest Hedge 
Gain 0.062 0.054 0.031 0.025 0.017 0.013 0.027 -0.015 -0.009 -0.050 0.112 
n = 28,516 (0.051) (0.091) (0.031) (0.025) (0.214) (0.299) (0.107) (0.362) (0.609) (0.024) (0.007) 
Loss -0.093 -0.025 0.005 -0.031 0.000 -0.026 -0.020 0.000 -0.027 -0.069 -0.025 
n = 27,386 (0.072) (0.642) (0.927) (0.280) (0.997) (0.218) (0.266) (0.979) (0.144) (0.053) (0.593) 
            ARETt < 0 Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest Hedge 
Gain -0.035 -0.006 0.022 0.019 0.001 -0.002 0.012 0.011 0.009 -0.041 0.006 
n = 22,481 (0.344) (0.742) (0.471) (0.245) (0.931) (0.860) (0.461) (0.593) (0.587) (0.115) (0.879) 
Loss -0.037 0.025 0.020 -0.002 0.015 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 -0.038 -0.090 0.053 
n = 33,653 (0.403) (0.631) (0.635) (0.921) (0.352) (0.705) (0.876) (0.447) (0.093) (0.037) (0.199) 
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The table shows returns for 10 portfolios formed based on accruals for a sample of 56,156 observations over the period 1989 - 2011. It also shows returns for 
accrual portfolios in gain and loss years separately under different gain/loss proxies. Hedge is the return to the hedge portfolio with a long position in the lowest 
accrual portfolio and a short position in the highest accrual portfolio. The proxies for economic losses/gains are negative/positive values of either CF, ΔCF 
(change in CF), INDCF (industry-adjusted CF) and ARET. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
